In a confused and conflated argument that ignores the clear language in theĭeeds and settled deed interpretation precedent, the Neals devote most of their brief reserved NPRI, a portion of which (equating to a 34/320 th NPRI) now belongs to Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 144 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Have rendered judgment for Appellants, declaring that the mineral conveyance toĭuhig v. Participating royalty interest (NPRI) in the Sesslers, and When the law is properly applied, this Court must hold the following: 1) the Duhigĭoctrine does not apply to this case 2) the 1939 Deed reserved a 1/4 th floating non. Nor can this Court ignore long-standing precedentĬontrolling deed interpretation and the extremely limited application of the doctrine In support, Appellants would show:Ĭlear language of the 1939 Deed, including its two references to the mineral interest Judgment in their favor on the issue of title. Davis d/b/a JD Minerals, WalterĪllison Baen, Santos J. 18 TO THE HONORABLE EIGHTH COURT OF APPEALS:ĬOME NOW APPELLANTS James H. Ashbel Smith Land Co., 307 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Ancillary Claims (Responsive to Neal Brief 35-ĬERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. The Passage of Time and the Presumed Grant Doctrine Cannot Deprive Appellants of the NPRI They Own. The Sesslers reserved a 1/4th floating NPRI in the 1939 Deed. The Neals mispresent the language in the 1926 Deed and the law that governs its interpretation 9Ĭ. The language in the 1939 Deed precludes application of Duhigī. The Neals Misrepresent the Language in the 19 Deeds and Contradict Texas Supreme Court Authority Governing DeedĪ.
But again, as a precaution, Appellants show that more than a scintilla of evidence supports their claims against merit.
#COG OPERATING LLC TRIAL#
Further, the trial court does not appear to have reached the claims ancillary to title on the merits they were premature and are the only claims against COG.
likewise need not be reached here, as the trial court vacated the summary judgment entered in favor of COG, which COG has not appealed. ls that are ancillary to title can be remanded for disposition by the trial court, as it does not appear the trial court addressed those claims on the merits they were premature (the court nes to address those claims, Appellants here show that the various defenses alleged by the Neals lack merit, and more than a scintilla of evidence claims. Because Appellants own the floating NPRI, fact issues exist as to whether the Neals breached their executive duties (including by accepting royalty attributible to the Sessler NPRI, self-dealing, failing to inform NPRI owners of leases and royalties, and pressuring operators to ignore the NPRI). Appellants are not time-barred from benefitting from the NPRI they own. they own no gaps in title exist or are alleged.Ĭ. The Duhig Doctrine does not deprive Appellants of their ownership of the Sessler NPRI.ġ.) Concord Oil and its progeny preclude the Neals two-grant doctrine to create their Duhig estoppel/estoppel by deed argument.Ģ.) The 1939 Deed provides notice of the Haun conveyance (of one interest - a mineral interest), and excludes it from the grant.ģ.) Grantee Roberts had actual and constructive notice of the outstanding Haun interest from her pre-execution title opinion produced by the Neals.ī. Applying controlling rules of deed interpretation, Appellants own a portion of the Sessler NPRI.Ī. FLORES CLERK TABLE OF CONTENTS INDEX OF AUTHORITIES Hester 08-20-00205-CV ACCEPTED 08-20-00205-CV EIGHTH COURT OF APPEALS EL PASO, TEXAS 1:01 PM ELIZABETH G.
Davis d/b/a JD Minerals, Walter Allison Baen, Santos J. LAW OFFICE OF AUDREY MULLERT VICKNAIR Audrey Mullert Vicknair State Bar No. MANAGEMENT TRUST JESSIE FRANCES NEAL and COG OPERATING, LLC, AppelleesĪppeal from 112 th District Court, Upton County, Texas NEAL BRUSENHAN PROPERTIES, LP NEAL BRUSENHAN MANAGEMENT, LLC, AS GENERAL PARTNER OF NEAL BRUSENHAN PROPERTIES, LP ROBERT L. DAVIS d/b/a JD MINERALS, WALTER ALLISON BAEN, SANTOS J. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, EL PASO, TEXAS _
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